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Many think that expressivists have a problem with negation.1 I disagree. Or at
least, I disagree that expressivists have a problem with negation. For if there is a
problemwith negation, it is a problemmost of us have—those of us, expressivists
and descriptivists alike, who accept some plausible claims about the nature of
intentionality.
Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on
whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about
basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer
to this last question is, on most plausible attempts at solving the problem of
intentionality, no.
1 Introduction
According to metaethical expressivists, when I tell you that cannibalism is wrong
I do not take a stance on what the world is like—I am not in the business of
describing the world. In the jargon, expressivists deny that moral thought and
talk is representational. And this, according to the critics, precludes expressivists
from giving an explanation of the following fact:
negation: It is inconsistent to accept a moral sentence and its nega-
tion.
Some have taken this observation to raise a devastating problem for expressivists
(see Schroeder 2008c, for discussion).e claim is that descriptivists can give
an explanation of negation in terms of the representational properties of the
relevant sentences, and that this explanation is much better than any one that
expressivists have to oer.
Against this, I will argue that if negation is something that needs to be
explained, then any adequate explanation available to the descriptivist will be
available to the expressivist. So if expressivists have a problem with negation—if
1 E.g. Dreier 2006b,a, 2009, van Roojen 1996, Schroeder 2008c,a.
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they have no adequate explanation of negation—then it is a problem we all
have.
roughout I will lean heavily on a nontrivial assumption, viz. that there
is a solution to the problem of intentionality. More specically, I will assume
that we can explain, in non-intentional terms, why words and thoughts have
the representational properties that they do. I will not argue for that here—my
conclusions should be read as conditional on this assumption. But even the
conditional conclusions should be of interest, for this assumption is one that
many descriptivists would be happy to endorse.
2 The problem
At the relevant level of abstraction, expressivism about moral discourse (e.g.
Blackburn 1998, Gibbard 1990, Stevenson 1937) is a conjunction of two claims.
First, that the meaning of declarative ‘moral sentences’ is a function of the
mental states they are used to express. Second, that the relevant states of mind—
and moral thought more generally—are non-representational. According to
expressivism, to make a moral judgment does not involve taking a stance on
what the world is like—rather, it involves being in a desire-like state of some
kind.2
An example might help. When I claim that Tom is a cannibal I am describing
a way the world is, viz. one in which Tom is a cannibal. e point of making
this claim is to provide you with information about the world—to tell you that
the world is this way. And when I judge that Tom is a cannibal, I am taking a
stance on what the world is like—I am ruling out a way the world could be, viz.
one in which Tom is not a cannibal.
According to metaethical descriptivists, the same is true of my claim that
cannibalism is wrong. When I tell you that cannibalism is wrong I am describing
a way the world is. I am conveying information—about a realm of irreducibly
moral, sui generis facts, perhaps; or about some yet to be specied natural facts
(involving our conventions, our desires, or what have you). And when I think
that cannibalism is wrong, I am taking a stance on what the world is like—I am
ruling out a way the world could be, viz. one in which cannibalism is not wrong.
In contrast, expressivists hold that when I tell you that cannibalism is wrong
I am not describing a way the world is.e meaning of my utterance is thus not
given by how it represents the world as being. Rather, its meaning is given by
the fact that I thereby express some distinctive state of mind. And this state of
mind—the state of thinking that cannibalism is wrong—is not a representational
2 It may be best to reserve the term ‘expressivism’ for the rst of these two claims, and to use non-
cognitivism as a label for second one. I am following standard usage in using ‘expressivism’ for
the conjunction of these two claims, even though I think this obscures some important issues.
Fortunately, those issues are irrelevant for our present purposes.
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state.3 Rather, to a rst and rough approximation, it is the state of disapproving
of cannibalism. e point of uttering ‘cannibalism is wrong’ is to evince my
disapproval, and perhaps to get you to disapprove, of cannibalism.4
Now focus on the state of mind of accepting (1) and the state of mind of
accepting (2):
(1) Cannibalism is wrong.
(2) Cannibalism is not wrong.
ere is something defective about someone who is in both of these states—there
is some kind of conict, something like ‘intrapersonal disagreement’, among
those attitudes. As I will put it, all parties agree that it is inconsistent to accept
(1) while accepting (2).5 What is at issue is whether expressivists can provide an
explanation of this fact—more generally, whether expressivists can provide an
explanation of negation.
2.1 Candidate explanations
It could turn out that there is an explanation of negation in purely normative
terms. If so, that explanation will presumably be available to the expressivist.
Aer all, hers is a view about the nature ofmoral thought and talk, one that should
in principle be compatible with any rst-order moral theory. According to the
descriptivist, however, in order to explain negation we need to appeal to some
non-normative claims. In particular, we need to appeal to the representational
properties of moral judgments.6 And the problem is that, according to the
expressivist, these are properties that moral judgments do not have.
To see this more clearly, let me go over what the descriptivist’s explanation
of negation is supposed to be:7
3 At least not one which represents that cannibalism is wrong.
4 is distinction can be drawn in domains other than morality: e.g. epistemic modality, epistemic
normativity, causality, probability judgments, mathematics, and, in a way, negation itself, to name
a few—see, e.g. Yalcin 2011, Field 2009, Blackburn 1990, Price 1983, Pérez Carballo 2014, and
Price 1990, respectively. Most of the issues raised here do not depend on the specic avor of the
expressivist/descriptivist distinction under consideration. But because of its familiarity, and because
it is typically taken to be the locus of the negation problem, I will focus mainly on expressivism about
moral discourse.
5 It is not obvious how to characterize this type of conict in a way that is neutral between expressivism
and descriptivism (cf. §3.1), but I will assume there is such a way. I will say that the attitudes are
inconsistent with one another whenever they conict with one another in this particular way.
6 Here I am taking for granted that facts about the representational properties of mental states are
not normative. is is a substantial assumption, but one that plausibly makes things harder for
the expressivist. I trust that I am not begging any questions here, but I realize that the issues are
subtle—see e.g. Rosen 1997, Gibbard 1994, 2012 for discussion.
7 I will be assuming throughout that both parties agree on what Schroeder 2008b calls mentalism:
the view that mental content is explanatorily prior to linguistic content. As Schroeder points out,
mentalism is a non-trivial commitment of expressivism, one that descriptivists might deny. at
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descriptivist explanation: To accept a moral sentence is to
believe its representational content. e representational content of
a declarative moral sentence is incompatible with that of its negation.
But it is inconsistent to have beliefs with incompatible representational
contents. So it is inconsistent to accept a moral sentence and its negation.
Accepting a moral sentence, on the descriptivist picture, is a matter of having
a belief—of being in a state with a particular representational content. So the
explanation the descriptivist oers presupposes that moral judgments are repre-
sentational. Given her views on the nature of moral judgment, the expressivist
cannot appeal to descriptivist explanation in order to explain nega-
tion.
By itself, this observation does not rule out the possibility of a suitable
explanation of negation that is compatible with expressivism. But given
what we have said so far about expressivism, it is far from clear what such an
explanation could look like.
is is most clearly seen through an example. Recall that, according to our
toy version of expressivism, the attitude expressed by (1) is that of disapproval of
cannibalism, and the attitude expressed by (2) is that of tolerance of cannibalism.
So in order to explain why it is inconsistent to accept (1) and (2), the expressivist
needs to appeal to something like
disapproval forbids tolerance: It is inconsistent to disap-
prove of and tolerate the same thing.
us, she needs to assume that there is inconsistency in holding dierent types
of attitudes toward the same object.8 e descriptivist, in contrast, need only
assume that for some attitudes, there is inconsistency in holding that attitude
toward incompatible contents:
belief coherence: It is inconsistent to have beliefs with incompati-
ble representational contents.
And the dierence here, the critics insist, is subtle but important. For it
means that while belief coherence can be taken for granted in explaining
negation, disapproval forbids tolerance cannot.9 As Schroeder
(2008b) puts it:
said, mentalism seems to be the majority view among philosophers of mind and language—see e.g.
Grice 1957, 1969, Lewis 1975, Schier 1982, Stalnaker 1984, Davis 2002; notable dissenters include
Davidson 1974 and Dummett 1991—and can be motivated independently of the debate between
expressivists and descriptivists.
8 is is no mere artifact of the analysis of accepting (2) in terms of tolerance.ere simply is no way
of analyzing accepting (2) in terms of disapproval of anything that is incompatible with cannibalism.
Cf. Unwin 1999.
9 Cf. Schroeder 2008c on the dierence between ‘A-type’ and ‘B-type’ inconsistency.
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All [the] good models of inconsistency between mental states arose in [. . . ] cases of the
same attitude toward inconsistent contents. But tolerance of murder and disapproval
of murder are two distinct and apparently logically unrelated attitudes toward the same
content. [. . . ] Assuming that disapproval and tolerance of murder are inconsistent is
taking for granted everything that expressivists need to explain. (p. 48)
Now, there is room for the expressivist to push back. For example, she could
point out that in assuming that it is inconsistent to bear the belief relation to
incompatible propositions, the descriptivist is taking for granted everything
that needs to be explained. Aer all, there is no inconsistency in thinking p is
somewhat likely and at the same time thinking not-p is somewhat likely. By
relying on belief coherence, the descriptivist simply restated the problem:
for now we can ask why the incompatibility of two propositions—or the relation
between truth and falsity—should somehow give rise to a conict among the
relevant attitudes.10
Alternatively, she could point out that it seems inconsistent to have intran-
sitive preferences: to prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A. But there is no sense
in which the contents of these attitudes are incompatible.e kind of conict
among attitudes exhibited by disapproving and tolerating the same thing may
well be of a kind with that exhibited by having intransitive preferences. And
perhaps the conict exhibited by having intransitive preferences is of a kind
with that exhibited by having beliefs with incompatible contents. So it may be
that disapproval forbids tolerance has as good a claim as belief
coherence to be taken for granted in an explanation of negation.11
10 Cf. Price 1990. I do not mean to suggest that this line of response suces to get the expressivist out
of trouble. Surely the descriptivist could in turn point out ways in which thinking p is somewhat likely
diers from believing p—the latter, but not the former, ‘aims at the truth’, for example—that would
explain why beliefs, but not thoughts about what’s somewhat likely, with incompatible contents are
in conict. But it would be a mistake to think this would clearly suce to get the descriptivist out of
trouble. For the notion of aiming at the truth may well turn out to be a normative one (although
see Rosen 2001 for discussion, as well as the more recent overview of some of the relevant literature
in McHugh &Whiting 2014). And once we allow for normative notions to carry the explanatory
burden, it is no longer obvious that the resulting explanation is not available to the expressivist.
Be that as it may, I will not be presupposing in what follows that there is any merit to this line of
response on behalf of expressivists. (anks here to an anonymous reviewer.)
11 For a recent and ambitious attempt at relying on this type of conict between attitudes to give
an account of semantic and logical inconsistency, see Baker &Woods (2015). As Baker &Woods
(2015, 423) point out, citing Restall (2005), a version of inferentialism in the philosophy of logic
(known as ‘bilateralism’ or ‘rejectivism’) explains the meaning of logical constants in terms of both
acceptance and rejection, in an attempt at reconciling classical logic with the plausible idea that
the meaning of logical constants is determined by their introduction and elimination rules (see e.g.
Smiley 1996, Rumtt 2000). And this entire research program proceeds by taking something like
disapproval forbids tolerance—a type of conict between dierent attitudes towards the
same content—for granted in explaining the meaning of negation. See Incurvati & Schlöder 2019
for a fascinating proposal, one that builds on this ‘bilateral’ tradition, for how to account for logical
inconsistency in expressivist-friendly terms.
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But I do not intend to pursue this any further. Let us just grant the critic that it
is a desideratum for an explanation of negation that it only posit inconsistency
among attitudes of the same type, and only when their contents are inconsistent.
Can the expressivist provide an explanation meeting this desideratum?
On the face of it, it seems she can. True, our toy version of expressivism
posits inconsistency among attitudes of dierent types.12 But not all versions of
expressivism need to do that. In particular, the account of normative thought de-
veloped by Gibbard (1990) has all the resources to formulate such an explanation,
one that only posits inconsistency among attitudes of the same type.13
Start with a few denitions.14 For our purposes, a (complete) norm is a
partition of all possible courses of actions, relative to a given context, into three
categories: those that are required, those that are forbidden, and those that are
merely permitted—i.e., permitted but not required. A norm is thus essentially a
function that assigns to each course of action, relative to a context, one of three
possible values. We can now dene a system of norms as simply a set of norms.
Finally, say that an action is required (resp. forbidden or merely permitted) by a
system of norms just in case every complete norms in the set counts the action
as required (resp. forbidden or merely permitted).
On Gibbard’s picture, (1) expresses acceptance of a system of norms that
forbids cannibalism. And (2) expresses acceptance of a system of norms that
permits cannibalism. Since every norm that does not forbid cannibalism will
permit it, the system of norms corresponding to (1) will be disjoint from the one
12 Cf. fn. 8
13 Another view which is designed to have those resources is that of Schroeder 2008c,a. Schroeder
introduces the attitude of being for and suggests that we take (1) and (2) as both expressing the attitude
of being for, with (1) corresponding to being for disapproving of cannibalism and (2) corresponding
to being for not disapproving of murder. Unfortunately, introducing this much internal structure into
the relevant attitudes comes at a rather high cost. I do not have the space to rehearse the arguments
for that conclusion. For that, see Schroeder 2008a, esp. ch. 12. In my view, some of the diculties
that Schroeder raises for expressivists rely on an assumption that I think expressivists should reject,
viz. that ‘the meaning of a sentence is the mental state that it expresses’ (p. 177, my emphasis). But I
cannot argue for that here.
14 A word of warning. Much of what I go on to say may well be incompatible with the expressivist
picture in Gibbard 2003. In particular, whereas in Gibbard 1990 the objects of attitudes are sets of
norms, each of which determines a three-way partition of courses of actions (see e.g. Gibbard 1990,
p. 95), in Gibbard 2003 they are sets of hyperplans, each of which determines a two way partition of
courses of actions. I will also steer clear of Gibbard’s frequent gloss of a world-norm pair as ‘fully
opinionated credal-normative states’ for I think it can be misleading. A norm, as I will understand it,
is simply an abstract object that partitions possible courses of actions into three categories. What is
needed for an adequate theory of normative thought is not a theory of what norms ‘really’ are, but a
theory of what accepting a norm (or set thereof) amounts to. (Similarly, one can give an account of
belief without taking a stance on what possible worlds ‘really’ are, as long as one gives an adequate
account of what having a belief with some set of possible worlds as its content ultimately amounts
to.)
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corresponding to (2)—no complete norm can be in both a set of norms all of
which forbid cannibalism and a set of norms all of which permit cannibalism.15
is can be generalized further, to give an account of what accepting any
moral sentence amounts to. Rather than going over the details here, I will just
skip ahead and stipulate that (i) for any moral sentence there is a well-dened
system of norms corresponding to that sentence and that (ii) the system of norms
assigned to a moral sentence is disjoint from that assigned to its negation.16
Using these resources, the expressivist can now give an explanation of nega-
tion that is much like the one given by the descriptivist. Say that two systems
of norms are incompatible just in case they have an empty intersection. To give
an explanation of negation of the same form as descriptivist expla-
nation, we can replace disapproval forbids tolerance with
normative coherence: It is inconsistent to accept incompatible
systems of norms.
Once we do that, we get something that looks very much like descriptivist
explanation:
expressivist explanation: To accept a moral sentence is to
accept a system of norms corresponding to that sentence.e system
of norms corresponding to a sentence is incompatible with the system
of norms corresponding to its negation. But it is inconsistent to accept
15 is is, of course, an oversimplication. Gibbard’s hypothesis is that the attitude of accepting a
system of norms must ultimately be part of an adequate theory of human psychology. Gibbard
spends the rst two parts of the book sketching a hypothesis about what acceptance of a system of
norms could be, and how it could t within a plausible theory of human psychology. Doing full
justice to his account would take us far beyond the scope of this paper.
16 e story is a bit more complicated, for two reasons. First, because every sentence in the language
gets assigned a set of pairs consisting of a possible world and a norm.e interested reader should
consult Chapter 5 of Gibbard 1990, for the basic idea. Second, because as Dreier 1999 points out (p.
571), the story Gibbard tells needs to be revised if we are to get the right assignment for sentences
with normative predicates embedded in intensional contexts. (is is also the source of an objection
to Gibbard’s view in Unwin 2001—see pp. 62-65.)e problem, in a nutshell, is that on Gibbard’s
semantics, attitude verbs come out as quantifying over possible worlds. When embedding a clause
whose semantic value is a set of pairs, the resulting sentence comes out as a non-purely descriptive
claim. Intuitively, however, ‘Tom thinks that cannibalism is wrong’ is purely descriptive, even if
the prejacent is not. Fortunately, the needed revisions are reasonably straightforward. All that is
required is to interpret attitude verbs as quantiers over world-norm pairs, much like in semantics
for attitude reports in systems that replace sets of possible worlds with sets of centered worlds (for
an overview, see Ninan 2010).is will ensure that ‘Tom thinks that cannibalism is wrong’ is true at
a world-norm pair ⟨w , n⟩ i ‘Cannibalism is wrong’ is true in every world-norm pair compatible
with what Tom accepts in w—instead of what Gibbard’s original recipe yields, which is that ‘Tom
thinks that cannibalism is wrong’ is true at a world-norm pair ⟨w , n⟩ i for every w′ compatible
with what Tom thinks, ‘Cannibalism is wrong’ is true at ⟨w′ , n⟩ (note that the same ‘n’ is on both
sides of the biconditional).
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incompatible systems of norms. So it is inconsistent to accept a moral
sentence and its negation.
e point of the rest of the paper is to argue that, to the extent that descrip-
tivist explanation is a good explanation of negation, so is expres-
sivist explanation.
2.2 Qualms about the expressivist’s explanation
For those familiar with Gibbard’s formalism it should not come as a surprise
that expressivists can give an explanation of negation with much the same
structure as the one given by descriptivists.e problem many have with ex-
pressivist explanation, as I understand it, has to do with the status of
normative coherence.e concern is that in relying on normative
coherence, expressivists are assuming the very thing that they were supposed
to explain.
is sort of concern was voiced explicitly by Jamie Dreier, in a slightly dier-
ent context (he is talking of interpersonal disagreement, rather than inconsis-
tency):
e problem is that if we cannot say anything by way of explanation [of why accepting a
system of norms is inconsistent with accepting its complement], then we are hostage to the
possibility that the intuitive notion of disagreement that we rely on, that we are taking for
our purpose [sic] as primitive, is not friendly to [expressivist theories]. Maybe the intuitive
notion is this: when we can see, by our native grasp of our language, that your rejection
and my acceptance of this certain sentence counts as disagreement, that is because we
have a prior grasp on the idea that some sentence really express real propositions [...]
(Dreier 2009, p. 107)
Transposing this to the current context, the thought is this. In presupposing that
there are attitudes (accepting a system of norms) that relate to one another much
like beliefs do—attitudes that bear logical or inferential relations to one another
that mimic those that hold among beliefs—the expressivist may be relying on
assumptions she is not entitled to.
e worry is that the notion of inconsistency—and logical or inferential
notions more generally—is best explained, in the case of beliefs, in terms of
beliefs’ representational properties. And unless the expressivist has an alternative
explanation of howmoral judgments can stand in logical relations to one another,
the truth of claims like normative coherence may turn out to be evidence
against the very core claims the expressivist wants to make. As Paul Horwich
puts it—summarizing (Smith 1994)—the consensus is that ‘the expressivist owes
us some explanation of how it is possible for evaluations to function inferentially
as if they were beliefs’ (Horwich 1994, p. 19).
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Strictly speaking, this is not the only sort of complaint that has been leveled
against the sort of expressivist-friendly explanation I sketched above. Famously,
Nicholas Unwin has argued that expressivists are unable to distinguish what
it is to think that cannibalism is not wrong from what it is not to think that
cannibalism is wrong.17 Unwin’s concern, at least as it applies to the view formu-
lated in Gibbard 1990, arises quite naturally in light of Gibbard’s reliance on the
somewhat opaque notion of ‘ruling out’. As Gibbard would put it, to think that
cannibalism is not wrong just is to ‘rule out’ thinking that cannibalism is wrong.
But, the worry goes, a committed agnostic rules out thinking that cannibalism
is wrong without thereby thinking that cannibalism is not wrong—for she also
rules out thinking that cannibalism is not wrong. So we are lewithout the ability
to distinguish the agnostic from someone who thinks that cannibalism is wrong.
Unwin considers a number of dierent responses on Gibbard’s behalf, but nds
them all wanting. But one he does not consider (later oered in Gibbard 2003, pp.
72) is that the relevant notion of ‘ruling out’ should be understood in terms of
disagreement (or inconsistency). If that response is available to the expressivist,
she can maintain that the dierence between thinking that cannibalism is not
wrong and not thinking that cannibalism is wrong is that in the former, but not
the latter, one disagrees with thinking that cannibalism is wrong.
On the expressivist view sketched above, someone who thinks that cannibal-
ism is not wrong is someone whose state is characterized by a set of norms none
of which forbid cannibalism. And someone who does not think that cannibalism
is wrong is someone whose state is characterized by a set of norms not all of
which forbid cannibalism.e formalism clearly draws a distinction between
the two states. And to see that this is not a distinction without a dierence, it
suces to point out that the former state, but not the latter, is inconsistent with
thinking that cannibalism is wrong. To be sure, one might nd have method-
ological qualms about appealing to the notion of disagreement to characterize
the distinction between what thinking that cannibalism is not wrong and not
thinking that cannibalism is wrong. But this worry is ultimately one about the
status of normative coherence.18
17 See Unwin 1999, 2001. See also Dreier 2006b, who worries that the expressivist cannot tell us a story
as to the dierence between ‘indecision’ and ‘indierence’ about whether cannibalism is wrong—the
dierence between someone who accepts neither that cannibalism is wrong nor that cannibalism is
not wrong and someone who thinks cannibalism is merely permitted.
18 All of that said, this is not the only thing the expressivist can say. Following Gibbard 1990, we can
say that to accept a system of norms is to be in a certain dispositional state. Simplifying a fair bit
(in particular, eliding the distinction between internalizing and accepting a norm), we could say
that to accept a system of norms all of which forbid cannibalism is to be disposed to both feel guilt
upon engaging in cannibalism and to feel resentment towards others who engage in cannibalism.
And to accept a system of norms none of which forbid cannibalism is to be disposed both to not
feel guilt upon engaging in cannibalism and to not feel resentment towards others who engage in
cannibalism. Someone who is agnostic is just one who lacks both dispositions. (Compare this to
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3 Consistency and the attribution of content
All parties in the debate agree that it can be inconsistent to have a certain pattern
of beliefs. But according to the expressivist, beliefs are not alone in that. For on
her view there are states of mind that lack representational content which can
be inconsistent with one another as well.
is should be cause for alarm only if something like the following claim is
true:
priority of content: Beliefs are inconsistent with one another in
virtue of the way their representational contents relate to one another.
For then the question would arise as to what explains why states that don’t have
representational content could be inconsistent with one another much like be-
liefs can be. If priority of content is true, then belief coherence
might seem like a safe thing to appeal to in explaining negation, whereas
normative coherence might seem to cry out for an explanation.19 In
short, if priority of content is true, then expressivists face an explana-
tory challenge that descriptivists do not. But do we have reason to think that
priority of content is true?
My goal in this section is to argue that we do not. Before doing that, it is
worth taking a moment to understand what priority of content amounts
to.
3.1 Inconsistency and irrationality
ere are two notions in priority of content in need of clarication: the
‘in virtue of ’ locution, and the notion of inconsistency.
According to priority of content, facts about what contents states
have are prior to facts about which states are inconsistent. Priority here should
be understood as explanatory priority: it is (partly) because two beliefs have
contents that relate to one another in a particular way that the beliefs come to
be inconsistent with one another.is, I submit, is the best way of interpreting
priority of content so as to raise a prima facie problem for expressivists.
I expect mention of relations of metaphysical dependence will make some
nervous. So let me just reiterate that in order to make sense of the negation prob-
lem, we need to make sense of the notion of ‘in virtue of ’, or the related notion
of metaphysical explanation. e problem, recall, is based on an explanatory
what a dispositional account of belief would say about the dierence between someone who has an
opinion on whether it is raining and someone who is agnostic about it.)
19 Cf. Schroeder 2008c, p. 585: “By assigning the complement set of [complete systems of norms] to a
negated sentence, all that Gibbard’s account does, is to stipulate that it is to express a state of mind
that is inconsistent with the state of mind expressed by the original sentence. But it does nothing to
tell us [. . . ] why it is inconsistent with the state of mind expressed by the original sentence.”
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challenge.e challenge is that representational contents can play an explanatory
role that systems of norms cannot. And the notion of explanation here cannot
be causal. To the extent that the relevant notions of priority are unintelligible,
so is the negation problem. Here, I will simply grant the critic the intelligibility
of these notions. In so doing, I am only making the expressivist’s task more
dicult.20
As for the notion of inconsistency, let me just say something about what it
cannot be, if priority of content is to have a chance of being true.
Inconsistency cannot be dened so that two states are inconsistent just in
case they cannot be true at the same time.is is for two reasons. First, because
the challenge for the expressivist is that of explaining something she herself takes
to be true. But if only states with representational content can be inconsistent,
then the expressivist would just deny that the states of accepting (1) and (2) are
inconsistent.21 Second, and most importantly, because if that is how we dene
inconsistency, then priority of content will be trivially false.22
To see that, note that according to priority of content we can explain
why two beliefs are inconsistent by saying that their representational contents
are incompatible—i.e. that their contents cannot be true. But this is just another
way of saying that we can explain why two beliefs are inconsistent by saying that
they cannot both be true at the same time. And if as a matter of denition two
beliefs are inconsistent just in case they cannot both be true at the same time,
priority of content would boil down to the trivially false claim that we
can explain why two beliefs cannot be true at the same time by saying that they
cannot both be true at the same time.
How else should we understand inconsistency? One option is to tie incon-
sistency very closely with irrationality. Here’s how such a proposal could go. If
two beliefs are inconsistent, then it is irrational to be in both states at once. So
a necessary condition for two beliefs to be inconsistent is that it be irrational
to have both beliefs at once. Now, this cannot be a sucient condition for in-
consistency. It may be irrational to be in a so-called Moore-paradoxical state: it
20 For a defense of the intelligibility of these notions, see e.g. Rosen 2010.
21 I have done my best to avoid the debate over whether expressivist can say that our moral talk and
thought can be true—or have representational content—in some ‘minimal’ sense. In part, this is
because I suspect that if we understand inconsistency in terms of incompatible truth-conditions, and
we embrace some form of minimalist conception of truth, then negation is not something we
need to explain. But also, this is because there are some subtle issues here—e.g. whether expressivism
is compatible with minimalism—that are beyond the scope of this paper. On this point, see e.g.
Smith 1994, Dreier 2004.
22 What if we replaced priority of content with something like: ‘For two beliefs to be inconsis-
tent just is for their representational contents to be incompatible’?e problem for the expressivist,
on this view, would be that of giving a denition of inconsistency that draws the line where we
expect it to be—aer all, she cannot use the denition in terms of representational content. But
expressivists can simply give a denition of inconsistency in terms of incompatibility of system of
norms: two states of mind are inconsistent just in case the systems of norms that characterize them
have an empty intersection.
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may be irrational for me to believe that it is raining while believing that I do not
believe that it is raining. But intuitively there is no inconsistency in having both
of those beliefs at once.23 Still, we could say that inconsistency is a particular
kind of irrationality.24
One problem with this proposal is that it would rule out by denition views
on which it is sometimes rational to have inconsistent beliefs. We might think
that a lesson of the Paradox of the Preface is that it is sometimes rational to
have inconsistent beliefs. But even if we are willing to accept that inconsistency
always involves irrationality, themain problemwith this proposal is that, pending
further work, it is not very illuminating. For it fails to characterize what is
distinctive about inconsistency as opposed to any other type of irrationality.
Perhaps the thing to say is that inconsistency is a primitive notion. Plausibly,
whatever inconsistency amounts to, it had better be one of those relations among
mental states that are the object of our theories of rationality—say, the kind of
relation among mental states that is relevant for a computational or inferential
characterization of an agent’s cognitive economy. Beyond that, however, there
simply is not much more to say about what it is for two mental states to be
inconsistent. is still leaves it open whether there is an explanation of what
makes it the case that two states are inconsistent with one another. But even if
there is, such an explanation would not give an analysis of inconsistency.
What bearing does this have on the status of priority of content? I
have assumed that priority of content is a substantive claim. One lesson
from the preceding is that for this to be so, we need an independent grip on
the notion of inconsistency—either as a primitive notion, or as some restricted
type of irrationality.is means that it is in principle possible that this notion of
inconsistency will not be explained in terms of the notion of representational
content, and that instead the notion of inconsistency will play a role in the
explanation of why beliefs have the representational content that they have.
3.2 Against Priority of Content, I
What makes it the case that a particular thought of mine has the representational
content that it does? Call this the problem of explaining content—otherwise
known as the problem of intentionality. Presumably we all want to solve this
problem—descriptivists and expressivists alike.25 If it turned out that priority
23 For a more detailed argument against a straightforward analysis of logical relations among mental
states in terms of the rationality or irrationality of being in those states at once, see van Roojen 1996.
24 is line of thought is very much in line with the Fregean idea that the ‘[l]aws of logic [. . . ] are the
most general laws, which prescribe universally the way in which one ought to think if one is to think
at all’. Frege 1893, p. 12.
25 Of course, descriptivists need a solution to the problem that carries over to the case of moral beliefs,
whereas expressivists would be content with a solution to the problem that explains the content of
our non-moral beliefs. (Indeed, I believe one of the best motivations for metaethical expressivism is
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of content gets in the way of doing so, we would have a very good reason to
reject it.
What could this explanation of content look like? Here is a possible candidate.
Beliefs and desires are correlative dispositions to act.26 To believe that Tom is
a cannibal is to be disposed to act in a way that would satisfy one’s desires in a
world in which Tom is a cannibal and all of one’s other beliefs are true. Similarly,
to desire that cannibalism be outlawed is to be disposed to act in ways that would
tend to bring it about that cannibalism is outlawed in worlds in which one’s
beliefs are true.27
e proposition that gets assigned as the content of your belief that Tom
is a cannibal is an abstract object that is used to characterize your behavioral
dispositions (ditto for your desire that cannibalism be outlawed). I relate to
the proposition that Tom is a cannibal in virtue of having the belief that Tom
is a cannibal. But this is not some mysterious, non-natural relation, involving
some special faculty that gives me access to the realm of abstract objects. Rather,
it is much like the way in which a chair can relate to the number 4.2 in virtue
of weighing 4.2 pounds.28 ere is no mystery as to how a chair can bear the
weight in pounds relation to an abstract real number—there is no need to assume
that my chair has some super-natural faculty that allows it to reach out to some
platonic realm.
is way of thinking about content attribution—where propositions are used
to characterize our mental states much like numbers are used to characterize
weights—has much to recommend it. But for our purposes it is enough to
point out this much: something like this may be our best shot at solving the
problem of intentionality, viz. the problem of explaining why our beliefs and
desires have the content that they do. And while one could insist that this is
not a problem that needs to be solved, it is only reasonable that the expressivist
be allowed to assume otherwise. Recall the status of the dialectic thus far: the
expressivist oers a way of assigning disjoint contents to the attitudes expressed
by (1) and (2).e descriptivist complains that such an assignment of content is
merely a stipulation: she requests an explanation of why those attitudes should
be assigned the contents the expressivist assigns to them. It is only reasonable
that the descriptivist herself has an explanation of why the state I am in when
accepting (1) gets assigned the content that it does.
that, given our best shot at understanding what representation is, it follows that moral judgments
are not representational.) But this is not relevant for our purposes.
26 Cf. Stalnaker 1984. Incidentally, some expressivists—e.g. Gibbard 1990, p. 109—seem to explicitly
endorse a picture along these lines.
27 I suspect that much of what I have to say can be said even if one has alternative conceptions of
what beliefs and desires are. But I want to work with a specic proposal, at least for the sake of
concreteness.
28 Cf. the Postscript to Field 1978, in Field 2001. For critical discussion of the use of this analogy in this
context, see Crane 1990.
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Now, the story I’ve thus far described is overly simplistic and highly schematic.
In particular, this approach allows for far too much indeterminacy. Since my
beliefs and desires get their content in tandem, as it were, by changing the
contents of my beliefs and desires appropriately, one can end up with distinct
pairs of propositions that can characterize the same set of dispositions to act.29
us, more oen than not, versions of this story add an extra layer of complexity—
say, by requiring that the relevant objects can be used to identify the causal role
of the relevant mental state when taking into account an agent’s environment.30
At this level of detail, however, we can already draw some conclusions. And
these conclusions are enough to raise doubts about priority of content.
Consider the following analogy. Suppose you want an explanation for why
it is colder in Boston than it is in Canberra.31 I point out it is 20 degrees in
Boston, that it is 85 degrees in Canberra, and that 20 is less than 85. I take it this
would not be a satisfying explanation.e reason is that part of what justies
our assignment of numbers to magnitudes has to do with structural similarities
between, on the one hand, the relations between numbers and, on the other,
the relations between the magnitudes themselves. In other words, we use 20 to
index the temperature in Boston and 85 to measure the temperature in Canberra
among other things because 20 is smaller than 85 and it is colder in Boston than
it is in Canberra.
Similarly, we assign some set-theoretic objects as the contents of somemental
states because we think that the relations between those objects are structurally
similar to those that obtain between the mental states themselves. If we want an
explanation for why two mental states relate to each other in a particular way,
pointing out that the corresponding set-theoretic objects relate to one another
in the relevant way is not going to help. An explanation of the incompatibility of
two mental states in terms of their truth-conditions is no more satisfying than
the explanation of why Boston is colder than Canberra in terms of relations
between numbers.
I should note that this is all compatible with the claim that facts about what
content mental states have can do signicant explanatory work.32 e point here
29 We can think of this picture as one where representational contents aremodels of the relations among
mental states, as does Egan 1992, p. 452f.e indeterminacy arises for the same sort of reasons that
theories have unintended models. For an example, see Stalnaker 1984, p. 17.
30 See the discussion of information-theoretic approaches to intentionality below for an example of
ways of doing this.
31 Importantly, you are not interested in a reason to think that it is colder in Boston than it is in Canberra.
Stipulate you know that it is colder in Boston than it is in Canberra—you just traveled from one to
the other, say. What you want is to know why this is so.
32 Cf. Jackson & Pettit 1988, Dretske 1988. See also Egan 2010: “[C]ontent ascription plays a crucial
explanatory role: it is necessary to explain how the operation of a mathematically characterized
process constitutes the exercise of a cognitive capacity in the environment in which the process is
normally deployed.e device would compute the same mathematical function in any environment,
but only in some environments would its doing so enable the organism to see.” (p. 256)
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is that facts about what content states have cannot be used to explain why states
bear the sorts of relations to one another that are in turn used to explain why
those states have the content that they have.
I nd the above argument persuasive, but some might reasonably object.
ey will point out that I have ignored a possible way things could turn out,
once the explanatory project comes to an end. Perhaps I am right that some
facts about how states relate to one another are prior to facts about what content
states have. But this does not mean that all such facts are. In particular, this
does not mean that inconsistency facts are prior to what contents states have.
Take again the temperatures of Boston and Canberra.ere are facts about how
Boston and Canberra relate to one another (at a particular time) that explain
why we use 20 to measure the temperature of Boston and 85 to measure the
temperature of Canberra. And surely we cannot explain any of those facts in
terms of the relations between 20 and 85. But there may be other facts about how
Boston and Canberra relate to one another that we can explain in terms of the
relations between 20 and 85. In other words, it is compatible with all I have said
that inconsistency facts are not among those that explain what contents mental
states have.
3.3 Against Priority of Content, II
Fair enough. ere is a gap in the argument that needs to be closed. ings
could turn out so that inconsistency is explained by facts about contents, which
in turn are explained in terms of facts about relations among mental states, even
though the latter cannot by themselves explain inconsistency (although it is not
obvious how that story would go). But I think we can close that gap if we look
more closely at what an explanation of content is going to look like.
I noted above that if contents were assigned simply to index relations that
obtain among mental states, content facts would be massively underdetermined.
We can use dierent scales to index the temperatures of Boston and Canberra—
relations among Boston and Canberra and their meteorological properties don’t
pick out one unique scale over another. Why isn’t it the same with beliefs? Why
not index the relations that obtain amongmy belief states with propositions other
than those we would take to be the representational contents of those beliefs?33
e answer is that what contents beliefs have depends on more than just how
beliefs relate to one another. As proponents of information-theoretic accounts of
intentionality have long insisted, what representational content a mental state
has essentially depends on what information is carried by that mental state.34
Here, ‘information’ is a technical term, usually cashed out in terms of indication,
33 is is essentially the worry raised in Putnam 1980. Cf. also Crane 1990.
34 E.g. Dretske 1981, Fodor 1975, Millikan 1984. As Fodor put it, “as far as I can see, of the various
proposals around for a naturalistic account of content, only the informational one appears to have a
prayer of working.” Fodor 1994, p. 6
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tracking, or causal co-variation. On this picture, a belief has representational
content in virtue of indicating how things stand with the world. For example,
my belief that Tom is a cannibal—understood as a particular physical state I am
in—has the content that it does partly because it is a state that is typically caused
by the fact that Tom is a cannibal. In ‘normal conditions’, one can infer that Tom
is a cannibal from the fact that I believe that Tom is a cannibal.
e hard work for these views begins when trying to give an account of what
‘normal conditions’ are so that if (and only if) we take an agent’s state s to have
content p, then in normal conditions, the agent is in s if and only if p is true. For
if such an account is to help provide an explanation of content, it must be given
in non-intentional terms—in particular, we cannot presuppose anything about
the representational properties of s. And while it is plausible that we can give
such an account so that it works for simple, perceptual beliefs, it is not obvious
that we can give one that works in full generality.
Let me illustrate this point with an example. Consider a belief of an agent,
Lars, which we take to represent that there is an elephant in front of him. Call
that belief state e. Sometimes, Lars is in e when in fact there is an elephant in
front of him. Sometimes, however, he is in e when there is no elephant in the
vicinity. Lars is somewhat fond of recreational drugs, and whenever he is under
the eect of a hallucinogenic, seeing a picture of an elephant causes him to be in
state e. We can conclude that Lars is in state e if and only if either there is an
elephant in front of him or there is a picture of an elephant in front of him. If the
representational content of e were just the state of the world that co-varies with
Lars being in state e, then the content of e would not be that there is an elephant
in front of him. Rather, it would be that there is an elephant or a picture of an
elephant in front of him.
is is where talk of normal conditions comes in handy. Plausibly, a situation
in which Lars is under the inuence of hallucinogenic drugs is not normal: there
is something about Lars’ cognitive or perceptual system that is o, and this
because of the eect of the drugs. And plausibly, we can say what it is about the
system in virtue of which it is malfunctioning in purely non-intentional terms.
So while Lars being in e reliably co-varies with there being an elephant or a
picture of an elephant in front of him, in normal conditions his being in state e
does not. Instead, in normal conditions, his being in state e co-varies precisely
with there being an elephant in front of him. To put it in slightly dierent terms:
we can rule out some cause c of e from being content-determining by saying
that c only causes e when normal conditions do not obtain.
But now suppose Lars has a tendency for drawing odd inferences.35 When-
ever he believes that there is a dog in the house, he comes to believe that there
is a dog and a cat in the house; whenever he believes that there is a cat in the
house, he comes to believe that there is a dog and a cat in the house. Consider
35 Cf. Field 1990, p. 108f.
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now his belief state that there is a dog and a cat in the house, which we can label
d+c. Given the description of the setup, d+c does not reliably co-vary with
there being dogs and cats in the house. Rather, it reliably co-varies with there
being dogs or cats in the house. So why isn’t the content of d+c that there are
dogs or cats in the house?36
One would hope that, here again, appeal to normal conditions would do
the trick. Yet it is hard to see how that would work—at least if we are supposed
to cash out normality in non-intentional terms. It seems plausible that Lars’
perceptual machinery is working properly—he is not having hallucinations of
any kind, nor is he under the eect of some drug. Intuitively, what seems to be
going on here is that Lars is not reasoning according to the rules of logic. It is his
logical capacities that are malfunctioning in this context. And if this is to help us
explain why d+c has the content we take it to have, there must be some way
of characterizing what it is for Lars’ logical capacities to function properly in
non-intentional terms.37
We can put the point in slightly dierent terms. Suppose we could impose a
constraint on the assignment of content to Lars’ mental states of the following
sort:
constraint: Whenever state s is inconsistent with state s′, the content
assigned to s must be incompatible with the content assigned to s′.
en we could rule out the assignment of content that assigns a disjunction to
d+c by saying that it fails to satisfy constraint. Aer all, the state Lars is in
when he believes that there are cats and dogs in the house is inconsistent with
the state he is in when he believes that there are no cats in the house. And the
disjunctive content that there are cats or dogs in the house is not inconsistent
with the content that there are no cats in the house.
Of course, if we are to appeal to constraint as a way of solving this prob-
lem, we need to reject priority of content. So unless the descriptivist has
an alternative solution to oer, she will have to reject priority of content.
Now, you may not nd this example especially compelling. For, you might
reasonably think, Lars’ doxastic dispositions make him borderline unintelligi-
36 As the example suggests, this problem is related to the so-called disjunction problem—cf. Fodor
1987, 1990.e two problems are distinct, however, in that a solution to Lars’s problem would not
amount to a solution to the disjunction problem.
37 Cf. Fodor 1994, p. 76f: “Semantic atomism is the idea that the meaning of your words—mutatis
mutandis, the contents of your thoughts—is metaphysically independent of the inferences you are
preferred to draw. [. . . ] I think that the puzzles about inscrutability show that semantic atomism
is probably false in this strong form. e ontology of a language supervenes not on mind/world
connections alone, but on mind/world connections plus logical syntax. [W]hat [this] tells us about
naturalism in semantics is something we already knew; viz. that the program fails unless there is a
naturalistic account of inferring.” I should add here, however, that Fodor may have well changed his
mind about some of this—see Rey 2004
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ble.38 Perhaps it is just not possible to have the dispositions I stipulate in this
case. If so, I haven’t given any reason to think that constraint should play a
role in explaining why some thoughts have the content that they do. But a slight
variant of this case might do the trick instead.39
Suppose Lars believes, falsely, that cats and dogs always follow each other
around. Wherever you see a dog, there is a cat somewhere in the vicinity, and
vice versa. So, whenever Lars comes to believe there’s a dog in the house, he forms
the belief that there is a dog in the house, he comes to be in d+c—similarly,
whenever he comes to believe there’s a cat in the house, he comes to be in d+c.
Now, surely, d+c reliably co-varies with there being a dog or a cat in the house.
And it does not reliably co-vary with there being a dog and a cat in the house.
So we need some story as to why d+c gets to have the content that it does, viz.
that there is a dog and a cat in the house.
Again, we might try saying that in this case, what matters is whether d+c co-
varies in normal conditions with there being a cat and a house. And presumably
what we’d want to say is that normal conditions obtain if and when Lars does
not have the false belief that cats and dogs always follow each other around. But
this alone would not do. For we need to specify what normal conditions are in
non-intentional terms.
Here too appealing to constraint could help solve our little problem.
But in appealing to constraint, we would have to give up on priority of
content.
What would an alternative solution look like? One might insist that there
are logical relations among mental states other than inconsistency that play a
role in determining what contents those states have. For instance, one might
replace constraint with:
constraint∗:e content assigned to s must entail the one assigned
to s′ only when being in state s entitles an agent to being in state s′.
If our assignment of content is to satisfy constraint∗, we could not assign
a disjunction to d+c. For Lars’s belief that there are cats in the room does not
entitle him to being in d+c. Indeed, his logical failure lies precisely in the fact
that he moves from a state he is entitled to be to a state he is not entitled to be.
Assigning to d+c the disjunctive content—which is entailed by the content of
his belief that there are cats—would run afoul of constraint∗.
Now, strictly speaking, constraint∗ is not incompatible with priority
of content. It is only incompatible with a related principle, viz. that entitle-
ment relations among beliefs obtain in virtue of the contents that those states
have. And while one could hold on to this related principle while denying pri-
ority of content, it is hard to see what the motivation for doing so would
38 anks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on this point.
39 is version of the case is much closer to the one given in Field 1990.
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be.40 Aer all, the likely explanation for why basic entitlement relations are not
explained in terms of the truth-conditional contents of the relevant states is that
broadly logical relations among mental states are prior to whatever contents they
have.
Admittedly, I have not argued that there is no alternative solution to this
problem. For all I have said, there could be a way of explaining content that
avoids having to postulate logical relations among mental states that are prior
to facts about the contents of mental states.41 But at the very least, the burden
should now be on the descriptivist to give a defense of priority of content
in light of these objections.
4 Conclusions
e negation problem is, at bottom, an explanatory challenge: that of explaining
negation.e presumption is that descriptivists, but not expressivists, have
a good explanation of negation. I have argued that this presumption is
mistaken. To the extent that expressivists are unable to explain negation, so
are descriptivists. So if negation is something that needs to be explained,
then this is a problem we all have.
My argument was based on twomain claims. First, that for descriptivist
explanation to be a better explanation than expressivist explana-
tion, it must be that priority of content is true. Second, that if some of
the more promising attempts at explaining of content—at solving the problem
of intentionality—are on the right track, priority of content must be
false.us, unless we give up on the project of explaining content, we have good
reason to reject priority of content, and thus that descriptivist
explanation is any better than expressivist explanation.is is
not to say that either of those explanations is any good—I want to remain neutral
on that. My point has been to argue that if expressivists have a problem with
negation—if they have no adequate explanation of negation—then it is a
problem we all have.
40 Interestingly, there are good reasons for thinking that, in order to explain why negation means what
it does, while insisting that negation has its ‘classical’ meaning, we need to rely on some prior attitude
of rejection or, perhaps, disagreement. See e.g. Price 1990, Rumtt 2000, Price n.d.
41 It is worth noting, however, that the view that the meaning of logical vocabulary should not be
explained in terms of representational notions is not especially controversial. Cf. e.g. Boghossian
2011, p. 493: “it’s hard to see what else could constitute meaning conjunction by ‘and’ except being
prepared to use it according to some rules and not others (most plausibly, the standard introduction
and elimination rules for ‘and’). Accounts that might be thought to have a chance of success with
other words—information-theoretic accounts, for example, or explicit denitions, or teleological
accounts—don’t seem to have any purchase in the case of the logical constants.” Even Jerry Fodor,
the arch-enemy of any inferentialist theory of meaning, ended up granting that the meaning of
logical constants cannot explained in representational terms, but rather in purely inferential terms.
See Fodor 1990, p. 110-111 and Fodor 1994, p. 74-77.
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In this respect, my solution to the negation problem is more ambitious than
a recent one oered by Allan Gibbard.42 Gibbard argues that if descriptivists are
allowed to rely on something like priority of content, the expressivist is
allowed to rely on a dierent claimof explanatory priority: they are allowed to rely
on the claim that facts about inconsistency are prior to facts about what contents
states have. As I understand it, his claim is that both claims of explanatory
priority are on a par. If I am right, however, this is not so: if we are to arrive at
an adequate explanation of content, I have urged, we must reject priority of
content. Facts about how our mental states logically relate to one another are
prior to facts about what representational content, if any, those states happen to
have.43
References
Baker, Derek & Jack Woods. 2015. How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsis-
tency. Ethics 125(2). 391–424.
Blackburn, Simon. 1990. Hume andick Connexions. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 50. 237–250.
Blackburn, Simon. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
Boghossian, Paul A. 2011. Williamson on the a Priori and the Analytic. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 82(2). 488–497.
Crane, Tim. 1990. An Alleged Analogy Between Numbers and Propositions. Analysis
50(4). 224–230.
Davidson, Donald. 1974. Belief and the Basis of Meaning. English. Synthese 27(3-4). 309–
323.
Davis, Wayne A. 2002.Meaning, Expression, andought. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Dreier, James. 1999. Transforming Expressivism. Noûs 33(4). 558–572.
Dreier, James. 2004. Meta-Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism. Philosophical
Perspectives 18(1). 23–44.
Dreier, James. 2006a. Disagreeing (About) What to Do: Negation and Completeness
in Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(3).
714–721.
42 Gibbard 2012, Appendix 2.
43 An interesting upshot of this conclusion is that that some well-known arguments for the view
that intentions involve belief—what Michael Bratman calls cognitivism about practical reason—are
undermined, for they presuppose that norms of epistemic rationality can be explained in terms of
their truth-conditions (Cf. Wallace 2001). Very roughly, the idea is that in order to explain why there
are consistency requirements on intention, we must assume that intentions involve beliefs. But the
reason this is supposed to help explain why it is irrational to intend to ϕ while at the same intending
to not-ϕ is that the beliefs that are thereby implicated have incompatible truth-conditions, and that
it is irrational to have beliefs with incompatible truth-conditions. If I am right, however, the putative
explanandum is no more in need of an explanation than the explanans.
20
Dreier, James. 2006b. Negation for Expressivists: A Collection of Problems With a Sug-
gestion foreir Solution. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics,
vol. 1, 217–233. Oxford University Press.
Dreier, James. 2009. Relativism (And Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement.
Philosophical Perspectives 23(1). 79–110.
Dretske, Fred. 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Dretske, Fred. 1988. Explaining Behavior: Reasons in aWorld of Causes. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press.
Dummett, Michael. 1991.e Relative Priority ofought and Language. In. Frege and
Other Philosophers. Oxford University Press. 315–324.
Egan, Frances. 1992. Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content.Mind 101(403).
443–459.
Egan, Frances. 2010. Computational Models: A Modest Role for Content. Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science 41(3). 253–259.
Field, Hartry. 1978. Mental Representation. Erkenntnis 13(1). 9–61.
Field, Hartry. 1990. ‘Narrow’ Aspects of Intentionality and the Information-eoretic
Approach to Content. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics and Episte-
mology, 102–116. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Field, Hartry. 2001. Truth and the Absence of Fact. New York: Oxford University Press.
Field, Hartry. 2009. Epistemology Without Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 143(2).
249–290.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1975.e Language ofought. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1987. Psychosemantics:e Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1990. Aeory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1994.e Elm and the Expert. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Frege, Gottlob. 1893. Grundgesetze Der Aritmetik. Vol. 1. Jena. Translated as Gottlob Frege.
1967. Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Trans. by Montgomery Fush. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press. Page numbers refer to this translation.
Gibbard, Allan. 1990.Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: Aeory of Normative Judgment. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Gibbard, Allan. 1994. Meaning and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 5. 95–115.
Gibbard, Allan. 2003.inking How to Live. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Gibbard, Allan. 2012.Meaning and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grice, H. P. 1957. Meaning. Philosophical Review 66(3). 377–388.
Grice, H. P. 1969. Utterer’s Meaning and Intention. Philosophical Review 78(2). 147–177.
Horwich, Paul. 1994.e Essence of Expressivism. Analysis 54(1). 19–20.
Incurvati, Luca & Julian J. Schlöder. 2019. Inferential Expressivism and the Negation
Problem. Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Forthcoming.
Jackson, Frank & Philip Pettit. 1988. Functionalism and Broad Content.Mind 96(387).
381–400.
Lewis, David. 1975. Languages and Language. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science 7. 3–35. Reprinted in Lewis 1983, pp. 163–189.
Lewis, David. 1983. Philosophical Papers. Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press.
McHugh, Conor & Daniel Whiting. 2014.e Normativity of Belief. Analysis 74(4). 698–
713.
21
Millikan, Ruth G. 1984. Language, ought and Other Biological Objects. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.
Ninan, Dilip. 2010. De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication. Philosophy Compass
5(7). 551–567.
Pérez Carballo, Alejandro. 2014. Structuring Logical Space. Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research. Early View.
Price, Huw. n.d. ‘Not’ Again. Unpublished manuscript, Cambridge University.
Price, Huw. 1983. Does ‘Probably’ Modify Sense? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61(4).
396–408.
Price, Huw. 1990. Why ‘Not’?Mind 99(394). 221–238.
Putnam, Hilary. 1980. Models and Reality.e Journal of Symbolic Logic 45(3). 464–482.
Restall, Greg. 2005. Multiple Conclusions. In Luis Valdes-Villanueva Petr Hajek & Dag
Westerstahl (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the
Twelh International Congress, 189–205. London: Kings’ College Publications.
Rey, Georges. 2004. Fodor’s Ingratitude and Change of Heart?Mind & Language 19(1).
70–84.
Rosen, Gideon. 1997. Who Makes the Rules Around Here? Philosophy and Phenomenolog-
ical Research 57(1). 163–171.
Rosen, Gideon. 2001. Brandom on Modality, Normativity and Intentionality. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 63(3). 611–623.
Rosen, Gideon. 2010. Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction. In Bob Hale
& Aviv Homann (eds.),Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Rumtt, Ian. 2000. “Yes” and “No”.Mind 109(436). 781–823.
Schier, S. 1982. Intention-Based Semantics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23(2).
119–156.
Schroeder, Mark. 2008a. Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schroeder, Mark. 2008b. Expression for Expressivists. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 76(1). 86–116.
Schroeder, Mark. 2008c. How Expressivists Can and Should Solveeir ProblemWith
Negation. Noûs 42(4). 573–599.
Smiley, Timothy. 1996. Rejection. Analysis 56(1). 1–9.
Smith, Michael. 1994. Why Expressivists About Value Should Love Minimalism About
Truth. Analysis 54(1). 1–11.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1984. Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford books, MIT Press.
Stevenson, Charles Leslie. 1937.e Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.Mind 46(181).
14–31.
Unwin, Nicholas. 1999. Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem. e
Philosophical Quarterly 49(196). 337–352.
Unwin, Nicholas. 2001. Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard’s Logic.e Philo-
sophical Quarterly 51(202). 60–75.
van Roojen, Mark. 1996. Expressivism and Irrationality. Philosophical Review 105(3). 311–
335.
Wallace, R. Jay. 2001. Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason. Philosophers’
Imprint 1(4). 1–26.
22
Yalcin, Seth. 2011. Nonfactualism About Epistemic Modality. In Andy Egan & Brian
Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality, 295–334. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23
